Popular Resistance of Sudan
A loosely coordinated Sudanese civilian armed-mobilisation coalition formed during the Sudanese civil war and aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Last updated August 26, 2026
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Overview
The Popular Resistance of Sudan, also described in Arabic as Al-Muqawamat ash-Sha'abiyah or popular mobilisation, is a loose coalition of civilian armed groups and local mobilisation committees that emerged during Sudan's civil war. The conflict began on 15 April 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti. The Popular Resistance developed principally as a pro-SAF mobilisation under the language of defending Sudan's national dignity, communities and property against the RSF's territorial expansion and alleged abuses. The movement is not a conventional company, political party or unified military service. It has no consistently documented central command, standardized equipment system or single field structure. Instead, local groups operate in areas controlled or influenced by the SAF, while army officers, soldiers and non-commissioned officers provide training and, according to the cited reference material, weapons. Recruitment and training have taken place in neighbourhoods and camps in several states, including River Nile, North Darfur, Al-Qadarif, Sennar, Red Sea and Khartoum. Some participants reportedly perform local security duties, while others have fought alongside regular SAF units. The coalition's growth accelerated as the RSF captured territory outside Khartoum, including Gezira State in December 2023. Civilian armament was presented by supporters as a response to insecurity and the need for local self-defence. Government officials and state-aligned media promoted mobilisation initiatives, and regional authorities announced training or recruitment programmes. In March 2024, a founding conference in Port Sudan sought to establish a Supreme Council of Popular Resistance. Muhammad al-Amin Turk was reported as chair, Lieutenant General Khader al-Mubarak Ali as deputy, and Azhari al-Mubarak Muhammad as head of the movement. The conference did not eliminate the coalition's fragmented character. The Popular Resistance includes groups with differing political backgrounds. Some participants are associated with local community defence, pro-revolutionary networks or youth organisations, while other factions have links to Islamist currents and former Popular Defence Forces structures. The Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion is identified in the reference material as an Islamist-aligned formation fighting with the SAF. Such participation has made the Popular Resistance an important component of the army's broader wartime mobilisation, but it has also generated concerns about ideological influence, accountability, proliferation of weapons and the risk that civilian arming could deepen Sudan's ethnic, regional and political fragmentation. Supporters and affiliated figures have claimed that Popular Resistance members contributed to SAF operations in Omdurman, around the Sudanese Radio and Television Corporation, in Kordofan and in other theatres. The scale and operational role of the movement vary by locality: some accounts describe thousands of recruits and frontline participation, whereas some army personnel characterize local groups primarily as neighbourhood or site-security forces. Consequently, the Popular Resistance is best understood as an umbrella mobilisation rather than a single fully institutionalized armed organization. Its future depends on the course of the war, the relationship between civilian recruits and the SAF, and any eventual process for disarming, integrating or politically regulating affiliated forces.
History
The Popular Resistance emerged in the context of Sudan's post-2019 political breakdown and the war that began on 15 April 2023. The immediate conflict was a confrontation between the SAF and RSF, two armed institutions that had previously shared power during the transitional period. Disputes over the future political order and the timetable for integrating the RSF into the regular army contributed to the outbreak of fighting. As the RSF expanded from its bases and gained control of territory, SAF leaders sought broader social and military support. In June 2023, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan promoted a mass mobilisation described as the Popular Resistance. Its stated purpose was to defend the state, communities and property, while its political language emphasized national dignity. The SAF reportedly supervised training and readiness camps and supplied weapons to some participants. Civilian recruits were trained by army personnel in neighbourhoods and other local settings. The result was a dispersed network rather than a single force with a stable chain of command. The mobilisation expanded as fighting spread from Khartoum to Darfur, Kordofan, Gezira and other regions. The RSF's capture of Gezira in December 2023, and reports of abuses in areas under its control, encouraged further recruitment among communities aligned with the SAF. Governors and other officials publicly backed training and arming initiatives. The movement was active in several northern and eastern states as well as in areas near the capital. Some affiliated groups guarded neighbourhoods and strategic sites; others claimed participation in frontline battles alongside the SAF. On 30 March 2024, a conference in Port Sudan established or proposed a Supreme Council of Popular Resistance. Muhammad al-Amin Turk was associated with the chairmanship, Khader al-Mubarak Ali with the deputy chairmanship, and Azhari al-Mubarak Muhammad was selected as head of the Popular Resistance. The attempted institutionalization did not fully unify local factions, many of which retained separate leaders, recruitment systems and political identities. The coalition also incorporated or operated alongside ideologically distinct formations. Some groups had backgrounds in opposition to military rule, while Islamist networks and former Popular Defence Forces members became influential in parts of the pro-SAF mobilisation. The Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion was identified as an Islamist-aligned armed formation fighting with the army. Its presence, together with the wider involvement of former regime-linked networks, led observers to question the movement's political direction and the extent of civilian control over affiliated forces. The Popular Resistance has been credited by its supporters with assisting SAF operations in Omdurman, at the Sudanese Radio and Television Corporation, in Kordofan and elsewhere. Reports differ over whether participants primarily conduct local protection or regularly engage in combat. This variation reflects the movement's decentralized nature. Its mobilisation has helped the SAF recruit manpower and reinforce its territorial support base, but widespread civilian access to weapons creates risks of revenge attacks, localised disorder, ethnic polarization and a prolonged armed conflict. Any postwar settlement would therefore face difficult questions about accountability, demobilization, integration and the status of the Popular Resistance's many component groups.
- 2024
Port Sudan founding conference
[1]A conference sought to establish a Supreme Council of Popular Resistance and identify a coordinating leadership.
- 2023
Civil war begins
[1]Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces began on 15 April, creating the security crisis in which the Popular Resistance developed.
- 2023
Popular Resistance mobilisation initiated
[1]Abdel Fattah al-Burhan promoted a SAF-backed civilian mobilisation framed around national defence and protection of communities and property.
- 2023
RSF takes control of Gezira State
[1]The RSF's advance into Gezira helped accelerate recruitment and arming of SAF-aligned civilian groups.
Products and positioning
A wartime national-defence and civilian mobilisation banner aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces; not a commercial consumer brand.
Marketing campaigns
- 2024Popular Resistance recruitment and training
Sudan
Regional authorities and SAF-linked actors supported training and recruitment in army-controlled areas, including North Darfur, River Nile, Al-Qadarif, Sennar, Red Sea and Khartoum.
Outcome. Thousands were reportedly recruited or trained, but the coalition remained organizationally decentralized.
- 2023National dignity mobilisation
Sudan
The SAF promoted civilian recruitment, training and arming under the Popular Resistance banner, presenting participation as defence of the nation, communities and property against the RSF.
Outcome. The mobilisation expanded across several states and produced a fragmented network of local armed groups with varying security and combat roles.
Brand decisions
2024
Attempt to create a Supreme CouncilStrategyBackground
Local Popular Resistance factions operated with limited central coordination across SAF-controlled areas.
Action taken
A Port Sudan conference established a proposed Supreme Council and selected associated officeholders.
Aftermath
Most factions reportedly continued to operate separately, leaving the movement only partially institutionalized.
2023
Adopt civilian armed mobilisation as a wartime strategyStrategyBackground
The SAF sought additional manpower and local support as the war with the RSF spread beyond Khartoum.
Action taken
It backed the formation and training of Popular Resistance groups and supplied weapons to some participants.
Aftermath
The strategy strengthened the SAF's mobilisation base but raised concerns about militia proliferation, ideological influence and accountability.
- Rapid Support Forces — The RSF increased its own recruitment efforts and cited SAF mobilisation as part of the justification for expanding operations.
Recent events
- 2024
Supreme Council of Popular Resistance announced in Port Sudan[1]
Leadership change · Other
A founding conference attempted to create a coordinating council, although most affiliated factions continued to operate with substantial autonomy.
- 2024
Popular Resistance groups reported in multiple Sudanese states[1]
Other
Recruitment, training and mobilisation activities were reported in areas including North Darfur, Al-Qadarif, Sennar, Red Sea and Khartoum states.
- 2023
Popular Resistance mobilisation begins during Sudan's civil war[1]
Other
The SAF-associated mobilisation was launched to unite civilians and political-social groups under a national-defence banner and to support local resistance to the RSF.
- 2023
RSF capture of Gezira intensifies civilian mobilisation[1]
Other
The RSF's seizure of Gezira State was described in the reference material as a major catalyst for further civilian recruitment and arming by SAF-aligned networks.
Sources2 sources
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